Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1981

State of Utah v. Walter Darwin Barker : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Robert M. McRae; Attorney for Respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Barker, No. 16676 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1975

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF Tl'I» '.
STATE OF U'l'AH

.;

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vs-

J

WALTER DARWIN BARKER,

Defendant-Respondent!

M. McRAE

Attorney Sponsored
for Respondent
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE------------------- l
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT---------------------------- l
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL------------------------------- 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS------------------------------------ 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
BECAUSE THE SIXTEEN SEPARATELY
OWNED VEHICLES WERE ALL DAMAGED
BY A SINGLE CRIMINAL ACT PROCEEDING FROM THE SAME WRONGFUL
INTENT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
QUASHING THE THIRD DEGREE FELONY
CHARGE-------------------------- 3
A.
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF IS AN OFFENSE
AGAINST PROPERTY, NOT AGAINST
THE VARIOUS OWNERS OF THE
DAMAGED PROPERTY---------------- 4
B.
RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE
A SINGLE OFFENSE BECAUSE THE
DAMAGE TO EACH CAR WAS PART OF
THE SAME CRIMINAL ACT PROCEEDING FROM THE SAME WRONGFUL
INTENT-------------------------- 6
C.
THE APPROPRIATE CHARGE IS A
SIHGLE THIRD DEGREE FELONY
BASED ON THE AGGREGATE VALUE
OF THE DAMAGE WHICH IS
APPROXIMATELY $1,800.00--------- 13
CONCLUSION-------------------------------------------- 14
CASES CITED
Hearn v.
People v.
State v.
State v.

State, 55 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1951)-------------- 8
Cisneros, 566 P.2d 703 (Colo. 1977)--------- 5
Gibson, 37 Utah 330, 108 Pac. 349 (1910)----- 10
McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890
(1971)------------------------------------- 11
State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507, 65 Pac. 458 (1901)------ 8
State v. Warren, 77 Mo. 121, 26 A. 500 (1893)--------- 8
Territory v. Olsen, 6 Utah 284, 22 Pac. 163 (1889)---- 4

-iSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1953), as amended-------Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (3) (a) (b) (c) (1953), as
amended---------------------------------- 11
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506. l (1953), as amended------ 12
Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 9-4 ( 1953), as amended--------- 12

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
28 A.L.R.2d
53 A. L. R. 3d
22 C.J.S. §
54 C.J.S. §
2 Wharton's
2 Wharton's

1182-----------------------------------398------------------------------------3 p.2----------------------------------12 p.947-------------------------------Criminal Law and Procedure, § 450------Criminal Law and Procedure, § 451-------

-ii-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
11
9
6
9
8,9

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
16676

-vsWALTER DARWIN BARKER,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant is charged with the offense of
Criminaf Mischief, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(1) (c)

(1953),

as amended, in that he intentionally damaged, defaced or
destroyed the property of another, causing pecuniary loss
in excess of $1,000.00 in value.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County rendered a final order granting the defendant's
Motion to Quash.

Said order was entered on August 22, 1979,

the Honorable Peter F. Leary, presiding.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State seeks to have the order granting
the defendant's Motion to Quash set aside, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann.

§

77-39-4

(1953), as amended.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 8, 1979, Walter Darwin Barker

damage~

the windshields of sixteen separately owned motor vehicies.
The vehicles were all parked in the parking lot of P.J. 's
LOunge in Salt Lake City, and were all damaged during a
period of sever al minutes.

The total value of the damage

to all sixteen vehicles was approximately $1, BOO. 00.

oa::::1

to any single vehicle did not exceed $250. 00 (R. 8).

Becac;,

appellant acted "intentionally" in damaging property not

1

belonging to him, and because the aggregate damage resul::::
from the same criminal act exceeded the $1, 000 statutory
minimum, the State charged the defendant (respondent in
this appeal) with the third degree felony offense of
Criminal Mischief pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-6-106

(1953), as amended.
The defendant filed a motion to quash the
motion stating that "the facts alleged constituting a
third degree felony establish that no third degree felony
exists, but rather a series of misdemeanors with differen: ·
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victims."

(R.18).

On August 17, 1979, a hearing on the

motion was held (R.34).

The trial court then took the

motion under advisement, and subsequently ordered that
the motion be granted (R.26).
The State appeals from that order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE THE SIXTEEN SEPARATELY OWNED
VEHICLES WERE ALL DAflAGED BY A SINGLE
CRIMIHAL ACT PROCEEDING FROM THE SAME
WRONGFUL IHTENT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN QUASHING THE THIRD DEGREE FELONY
CHARGE.
The only issue on appeal is whether respondent's
criminal act of damaging the windshields of sixteen
separately ovmed automobiles at the same tine and place
may be charged as one offense or must be charged as
sixteen separate offenses against the State.
Appellant submits that the ruling of the trial
court v;as in error, and that under the circumstances
presented in this case the law permits the aggregation
of all damages to property resulting from one continuous
act of criminal mischief proceeding from the same criminal
intent.
At the outset, appellant notes that this is a
question of first impression in this State, and consequently

-3-
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there is no Utah state case or statutory law directly on
point.
A

CRIMINAL MISCHIEF IS AN OFFENSE
AGAINST PROPERTY, NOT AGAINST THE
VARIOUS Ol'i'NERS OF THE DAMAGED
PROPERTY.
Under the common law, an element of the malicicj
mischief offense was malice against the owner of the prope;:I
Territory v.

Olsen,

6 Utah 284, 22 Pac. 163

(1889).

Becaus:I

malice against the owner was an element of the crime, each/
piece of property separately owned involved a different
criminal intent.

I

Therefore, damage to property of

different owners constituted a separate offense regardless

j

I

of how closely related in time and space the offenses may
have been.

1,

,
I

However, in adopting the Cr irninal Mischief Sta:a:I
(Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-106

(1953), as amended), the Statd

Utah departed significantly from the common law.
relevant portions of Section 76-6-106 state:

(1) A person commits criminal
mischief if: .
He intentionally damages,
(c)
defaces, or destroys the property of
another.
A violation of section
(2) (a)
76-6-106(1) (a) is a felony of the third
degree.
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The

(b)
A violation of section 76-6-106(1)
is a class A misdemeanor.
(c)
Any other violation of this
section is a felony of the third degree
if the actor's conduct causes or is
intended to cause pecuniary loss in
excess of $1,000 value; a class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or
is intended to cause pecuniary loss in
excess of $500; a class B misdemeanor if
the actor's conduct causes or is intended
to cause pecuniary loss in excess of $250;
and a class C misdemeanor if the actor's
conduct causes or is intended to cause
loss of less than $250.
(b)

The culpable mental state under the statute is
simply that the actor "intentionally" damages the property
of another.

Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-101(3) defines "the

property of another":
Property is that of another, if
anyone other than the actor has a
possessory or proprietary interest in
any portion thereof.
Therefore, as long as the accused intentionally damages
property not belonging to him he is culpable under the
Criminal Mischief Statute.

Any requirement that the action

stem from malice towards the property owner is noticeably
absent.

1

The statute focuses on the property and not the

property owner.

1

Therefore, unlike the common law offense

Colorado has a statute similar to Utah's Criminal Mischief
Statute.
The statute does not require malice against the
property owner as an element of the crime.
In People v.
Cisneros, 566 P.2d 703 (Colo. 1977), the Supreme Court of
Colorado held that the element of malice against the
property owner was intentionally pmitted, and the statute
should not be interpreted as having malice as an element.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of malicious mischief, a person charged under Utah's
Criminal Mischief Statute for damaging several pieces of
property at the same time and place may act with single,
continuous criminal intent even though the property is
owned by different owners.

Where this is the case, the

proper charge would be a single charge alleging a single
offense.

Corpus Juris Secondum states:
Where several violations of a
statute constitute but one offense,
as where conunitted at one time, a
fine for each violation cannot be
imposed.

54 C.J.S. Malicious Mischief § 12, p.

947.

Implicit in this statement is the notion that
if the damage to several property items resulted from a
single or continuous criminal act, the damages may be
aggregated and one offense charged.
B

RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE
A SINGLE OFFENSE BECAUSE THE DAMAGE
TO EACH CAR WAS PART OF THE SAME
CRIMINAL ACT PROCEEDING FROM THE
SAME WRONGFUL INTENT.
In the area of theft the notion that property
losses resulting froJT\ a continuous er iminal act may be
aggregated and one offense charged has long been recognize:
Because the policy behind both theft and er il'1inal mischie'.
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statutes is the same (i.e., the protection of private
property) the case law governing theft should be applied
by analogy to criminal mischief cases.

Concerning larceny cases where a person in a
single continuous act or transaction steals property items
belonging to several different owners, A.L.R.2d states:
In the vast majority of cases
wherein the issue of a single or multiple
larcenies has arisen, or been discussed,
the courts have held or stated that the
stealing of property from different
owners at the same time and at the same
place constitutes but one larceny.
28 A.L.R.2d 1182.
Thus, according to the majority rule, if
property belonging to several different owners is stolen
"at the same time and at the sar:ie place" the value of the
individual property items is aggregated and only one offense
is charged.

The defendant need not be separately charged

for each piece of stolen property belonging to a separate
owner.
The rationale for this rule is that the crime:
. . is an offense against the
public, and the prosecution is conducted
not in the name of the owner of the property,
nor in his behalf, but in the name of the
state, the primary object being to protect
the public against such offenses by the
punishment of the offender, and, although
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it is necessary to set out in the
indictment the ownership of the
property, this the law requires in
order that the prisoner may be
informed as to the precise nature
of the offense charged against him,
and further to enable him to plead
a former conviction or acquittal,
in bar of a subsequent prosecution for
th8 same offense.
So, it seems clear
to us, on principle, that the taking of
several articles of property under such
circumstances constitutes but one felony.
State v. Warren,

7 7 Mo. 121, 2 6 A.

5 0 0 ( 18 9 3) .

This reasoning has repeatedly been affirmed
and applied.

See 2 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure i

451; Annotation:

So.2d 559 (Fla.

28 A.L.R.2d 1152.

In Hearn v. State, SS

1951), a case involving the theft of

livestock belonging to different ovmers, the Supreme Court
of Florida adopted the majority rule stating:
Each case of this nature must be
determined by the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
There
is some conflict in the cases, but the
clear weight of authority is to the
effect that the stealing of several
articles at the same time and place
as one co~tinuous act or transaction
is a single offense, even though the
property belongs to different owners,
for the reason that it is only a single
act or taking.
We will align ourselves with
majority rule in this country.
(Emphasis added.)
This rule has also been adopted by the State of Utah.
State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507, 65 Pac. 458 (1901).
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Although respondent was charged with Criminal
Mischief, not theft, Criminal Mischief is not only an
offense against private property, but is an offense
against the public, and it is prosecuted by the state
to protect the public.

Individual property owners may

obtain redress from the offender through civil litigation.
But the charge of criminal mischief is an action to vindicate
the public and to punish the offender, not an action for or
on behalf of the owners of the damaged property.

Therefore,

once it has been established that the damaged property did
not belong to the defendant the focus is not on the ownership of the property, but on whether the property was damaged
in a single continuous criminal act proceeding from the same
criminal intent.
Corpus Juris Secondurn defines a criminal transaction as:

"An act or series of acts proceeding from one

wrongful impulse of the will.

22 C.J.S. § 3, p. 2.

See 2 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure§ 450, 451,
and accompanying footnotes 5 and 6.
Because criminal mischief is a crime against
proper~y

and the public, not the individual property

Owuers, property damaged in one continuous act proceeding
from the same wrongful conduct may be charged as one offense
even though the damaged property has several different
owners.
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This conclusion is consistent with decisions

~

embezzlement and theft cases.
For example in State v. Gibson, 37 Utah 330,

lo:

Pac. 34 9 ( 1910), a defendant was convicted of grand larcem·
for embezzling some $235.60 from the Theater Publishing
Company over the course of 38 days.

The statute in guesLc

made an offense grand larceny if the amount exceeded $50.0•
The largest single sum taken by the defendant at one time
was $48. 60.

The defendant requested an instruction that o:.:

a lesser charge of peti t larceny could be found.

This Cou:·

affirmed the trial court's refusal to give such an instruc::
stating:
We think no error was committed in
the ruling.
The case is not like
that argued to us by appellant ~~.ere
the successive larcenies each co~~lete
and distinct, did not constitute one
continuous tra~saction; or where
properties belonging to different
persons located at different places
were purloined, and where each
asportation constituted a separate
and distinct offense .
. But it is
one of embezzlement 'committed by a
series of connected transactions
from day to day'
. and shown to
be a 'continuous offense committed
by a trusted servant by means of a
series of connected transactions;
and in such case a charge of
embezzlement on a certain date will
cover and admit evidence of the whole'
. . . and is one constituting 'in fact
and in law a single embezzlement'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and where 'the one substantive charge
of embezzlement was supported by proof
of the receipt at different times of
the amount' the appellant 'was charged
to have embezzled and one converstion of
the whole.'
37 Utah at 332-333 (citation omitted).

A similar result was reached in State v. McCarthy,
25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890

(1971) where Justice Crockett

concluded that the theft of nineteen hams (grand larceny)
was not "a segmented transaction" requiring an instruction on
petty larceny.

See generally 53 ALR3d 398.

The statute defining the crime of "issuing a bad
check" supports the contention that the trial court erred
by quashing the information in this case.
§

76-6-505 (3) (a) (b) (c)

Utah Code Ann.

indicates that a series of checks

drawn within a period of six months may be aggregated to
determine the degree of offense.

-11-
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Utah Code Ann.

§76-6-506.l which proscribes the

fraudulent use of credit cards has a similar six-month
aggregation provision.
The language of the penalty section of the Crimi:
Mischief Statute also supports the position of the appelk:
Utah Code Ann.

§76-6-106 (2) (c)

speaks of an actor's conduc:

causing pecuniary loss and then provides penalties commens;:
with the amount of loss.
Appellant submits that the defendant's actions he:
are "conduct" within the meaning of §76-6-106 (2) (c).
The necessity of such construction is emphasized;
a hypothetical.

If a person were to break into a china

~~

and maliciously destroy hundreds of pieces of china with
several swings of a crow bar it would seem illogical to
charge him or her with several hundred misdemeanor counts o'
criminal mischief for each broken cup, saucer of plate when
the total value of the destruction was well over the fe~~J
Forcing the State to charge the defendant here
with sixteen separate misdemeanors when the property loss
occurred in the same way, in the same place and at the same
time cannot be consistent with the legislative intent of the
criminal mischief statute.
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c
THE APPROPRIATE CHARGE IS A
SINGLE THIRD DEGREE FELONY
BASED ON THE AGGREGATE VALUE
OF THE DAMAGE WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY $1800.00.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-106(2) (c)

(1953), as amended,

provides for different classes of offenses depending on the
amount of pecuniary loss resulting from the property

damage~

According to the statute, if the actor's conduct
causes of is intended to cause prcuniary loss in excess of
$1000.00, then the violation is a felony of the third degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101 (4) (1) provides that in
cases like the instant case the "value" of the damages referred
to above is determined by "the cost of repairing or replacing
the property within a reasonable time following the offense."
Because the damage to all 16 vehicles was the result
of the same criminal act proceeding from the same wrongful
intent, it constitutes a single criminal offense against
the state.

Consequently, in determining the damages resulting

from the offense, the damage to each car should be aggregated.
Based on the cost of repairs, the total value of the damage
done to all 16 vehicles is $1800.00, well above the $1000.00
statutory requirement for a felony charge.
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CONCLUSION
The proper charges in this case is a single thira
degree felony for the offense of Criminal Mischief,

t~~

is against property, and requires no malice towards the own
of the property.

Because criminal mischief is an offense

against property and not the property owner, if proper~
belonging to several different owners is damaged by one
continuous wrongful act one offense against the state may
be charged.

For purposes of that one charge the amount of

monetary damage to the various property i terns may be aggrega
Appellant prays for reversal of the trial Court's decision.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOl"I
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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